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The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that European competition lawyers – or at least 
most of them – do not need a shrink. More seriously, this paper underlines that a significant 
body of behavioral economics has already penetrated European Union (“EU”) competition 
law, in particular in the area of abuse of dominance. The big, recent buzz around behavioral 
economics in the competition community may thus just be an illustration of the “revival” 
factor. With a nice, startling package, one can make old products look new, and sell opium to 
the masses1.  
 
But let’s first take a step back. In essence, behavioral economics posits that individuals do not 
necessarily behave rationally. For physiological, cognitive and psychological reasons, 
individuals cannot – and do not – accumulate, process and analyze all the relevant information 
necessary to make welfare-optimizing decisions2. As a result, individuals on markets 
                                                           
1 Law, just like any other discipline, is subject to trends and fashions which shape its content. Historical studies, 
for example, have always been shaped by the ideological context of the moment. Today, “subaltern studies” – or 
the study of the life of common people – is the last trend of writing history, after Imperialism, Primitivism, 
Nationalism, Marxism, and Feminism. See O. LIGADE, “Subaltern Studies : A New Trend in History Writing”, 
International Research Journal, 2010, Vol. I,  N°6, p. 62. 
2
 Individuals do not act rationally. Human behavior presents features such as "bounded rationality," "bounded 
willpower," and "bounded self-interest." The first of these terms refers to the fact that people have “cognitive 
quirks that prevent them from processing information rationally”; the second that they exhibit weakness of will; 
and the last refers to the fact that people “sometimes act out of motives that do not seem explicable by self-
interest”. R. POSNER, “Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law”, Stanford Law Review, 1998, 
Vol. 50, No. 5, p. 1551. M. STUCKE, “Money, Is That What I Want?: Competition Policy and the Role of 
Behavioral Economics, Santa Clara Law Review, 2010, Vol. 50, p. 101 
Recent best-sellers have popularized behavioral economics: J. FOX, The Myth Of The Rational Market: A 
History Of Risk, Reward, And Delusion On Wall Street, New York, HarperBusiness, 2009, 400p.; G. AKERLOF 
& R. SHILLER, Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives The Economy, And Why It Matters For Global 
Capitalism, Princeton, Princeton University Press 2009, 264 p. ; D. ARIELY, Predictably Irrational: The 
Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions, New York, HarperCollins, 2008, 304p. ; R. THALER & C. 
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(consumers) make decisions which do not maximize their own satisfaction. Consumers of 
telecommunications or banking services do not switch, despite price competition. Similarly, 
individuals within firms (managers) make decisions which do not maximize profits. They for 
instance engage into exclusionary tactics, regardless of the costs associated to such conduct. 
 
To solve those problems, a more interventionist course of action – behavioral scholars talk of 
“paternalism”, or of “liberal paternalism” – is allegedly warranted3. This applies to 
competition rules, which should arguably be tweaked to correct behavioral failures. The 
debate on this issue is raging in the US, where the rationality assumption inherited from the 
works of Chicago scholars has shaped decades of antitrust case-law.  
 
On this side of the Atlantic, however, the European Commission (the “Commission”) and the 
EU Courts have seemed – consciously or not – more opened to behavioral economics when 
applying substantive competition law. The case-law adopted pursuant to Article 102 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) exhibits a noticeable degree of 
sympathy for the insights of behavioral economics. This is true in relation to the two 
analytical steps involved in a finding of unlawful conduct, namely the assessment of 




The penetration of behavioral economics in conventional dominance analysis can be observed 
firstly at the level of market definition (A), and secondly in relation to the assessment of the 
investigated firm’s market position (B).  
 
A. Market definition 
 
 
In EU competition law “a relevant product market comprises all those products and/or 
services which are regarded as [...] substitutable by the consumer, by reason of [their] 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
SUNSTEIN, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, And Happiness, New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 2008, 293 p.  
3
 See HM Government, “The Coalition: our programme for government”, May 2010, p.12 (available at: 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/409088/pfg_coalition.pdf): “We need to promote more responsible 
corporate and consumer behaviour through greater transparency and by harnessing the insights from behavioural 
economics and social psychology.” 




characteristics, […] prices and […] intended use”4. In order to assess demand-side 
substitutability, the Commission routinely relies on a proxy, the “SSNIP” test5. It involves 
testing whether customers of the investigated firm would switch to alternative products in 
response to a hypothetical small (5% to 10%) but permanent relative price increase. If 
substitution takes places, additional products shall be included in the relevant market.  
 
Behavioral economics provides some interesting insights on the issue of market definition. 
Irrational consumers may distinguish between goods which would otherwise be regarded as 
substitutes. The preference shown for a branded product as compared to a similar, unbranded 
good, may for instance lead to imperfect substitution patterns. In the same vein, the signature 
of a designer on a product; its endorsement by a celebrity (an artist or a sports professional); 
or its association to a social group (for instance, Veblen goods) may disconnect a particular 
good from its initial substitution category. The same applies again to generics medicines 
which are often perceived as different from original drugs, despite identical features. 
 
In the present state of EU competition law, the practice of market definition seems to already 
incorporate – at least in part – the findings of behavioral economics. First, if irrational 
consumers perceive theoretical substitutes as distinct products, then the SSNIP test will 
almost certainly lead to the delineation of distinct markets. If consumers regard a branded 
product as having no equivalent, it is likely that they will not shift to other products in 
response to a SSNIP price increase6.  
 
Second, the Commission is not blind to irrationality. It expressly follows “an open approach 
to empirical evidence, aimed at making an effective use of all available information which 
may be relevant in individual cases”7. In practice, it thus relies on empirical information – 
                                                           
4
 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, O.J., 
9 Dec. 1997, C 372, p. 5, para. 7. 
5
 Ibid., para. 17. ; SSNIP is an acronym for “Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price”. 
6
 “Perhaps, without knowing it, the counsel and judiciary were applying behavioral economics !” See V. ROSE, 
“The Role of Behavioral Economics in Competition Law: A Judicial Perspective”, Competition Policy 
International, Spring 2010, Vol. 6, N°1, pp. 106-107, who reports that black t-shirts bearing the logo of a rock 
band may constitute a market distinct from the market for t-shirts. This can be reflected in the price discrepancy 
between the two kind of products: average t-shirts were sold £3, while t-shirts with the logo were sold £18. 
7
 Communication from the Commission, Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ, C 45, 24 Feb 2009, 
pp. 7–20, [hereinafter “Guidance Document”] para. 25. 




point of sales scanner data and market interviews – which provides useful information on 
irrational factors that shape consumers’ demand8.  
 
Of course, a note of caution is necessary here. Interviews are not fully reliable. Individuals 
answer differently according to the way questions are phrased, so that so-called “framing” 
issues play an important role9. Answers to questionnaires may for instance reflect strategic 
biases or intrinsic behavioral biases (esprit de corps, fairness, etc.)10. It is thus important that 
competition authorities’ corroborate the findings of market interviews with other pieces of 




A same finding applies in the province of dominance. Put simply, a firm is deemed to occupy 
a dominant position where it enjoys significant market power. In the past, the Commission 
traditionally relied on market shares as a proxy for dominance. More recently, however, the 
Commission has placed an increased emphasis on the analysis of barriers to 
entry/expansion11. The conventional economic view is, indeed, that absent such barriers, no 
firm can exercize market power, on pain of inducing expansion/entry of rival firms. 
 
On this particular issue, behavioral economics bring interesting insights. It demonstrates first 
that competition authorities run a risk of type II errors (false negatives), in dismissing 
dominance concerns on the basis of observed low entry barriers. Empirical analysis indeed 
demonstrates that irrational factors may dissuade entry in markets with low entry barriers12. 
                                                           
8
 The Commission also acknowledges the influence brands may have on market definition. Commission Notice 
on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, op. cit., para. 41. 
9
 People make different choices when the same information is presented in different way. See M. SALINGER, 
“Behavioral economics, consumer protection and antitrust”, Competition Policy International, Spring 2010, Vol. 
6, n°1, p. 71. 
10
 It is for example asserted that biases of economic operators who were interviewed in the framework of merger 
investigations may have had the effect to lead to inappropriate mergers. See R. AMANDA & M. STUCKE, 
Behavioral Antitrust, 31 March 2010, University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 106., p. 42. 
(available at www.ssrn.com). 
11
 Guidance Document, op. cit., para. 9-12. The assessment of dominance is now made by the Commission on 
the basis of three factors: the market position of the dominant undertaking and its competitors ; the constraints 
imposed by the credible threat of future expansion by actual competitors or entry by potential competitors; the 
constraints imposed by the bargaining strength of the undertaking's customers. 
12
 For an important set of markets where anticompetitive conducts took place despite the fact that these markets 
were characterized by low entry barriers which should have induced entry, see M. STUCKE, “Behavioral 




Because individuals prefer a sure low gain to a higher hypothetical gain13, a potential entrant 
will prefer to spend resources, and secure gains, on its existing market, rather than to enter a 
new market, where gains are potentially higher, but haphazard. Moreover, organizational 
issues may also discourage entry. Large companies are in theory well-placed to exploit entry 
opportunities (they hold resources, etc.). However, in practice, their ability to enter a market 
might be undermined by bureaucratic gridlock14. 
 
Second, behavioral economics shows that competition authorities run a risk of type I errors 
(false positives), in reaching findings of dominance on account of high entry barriers. In blunt 
contradiction with neoclassical economic theory, empirical analysis indicates that firms often 
enter markets that are protected by high barriers15. To start, decision-makers often tend to be 
overconfident, by virtue of optimism and desirability biases16. Those individuals typically 
underestimate basic economic facts which run contrary to their projects, and overestimate the 
intrinsic value of their purported plans. In such settings, of course, entry may fail17, but the 
threat of irrational entry will discipline the incumbent firm.  
 
In addition, in markets where barriers to entry take the form of sunk costs (costly 
advertisement campaigns or R&D investments), managers may nonetheless decide to enter. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the 21st Century”, Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, 2007, vol 38, 
pp. 563-568. 
13
 This bias was demonstrated through a famous experience which established that test subjects tend to prefer a 
sure gain (e.g. a $50 reward) to a gamble (a fifty percent probability of winning $100), but are more willing to 
gamble a loss (opting for the fifty percent chance of paying a $100 fine), than paying a sure penalty ($50 fine).  
D. KAHNEMAN, “Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics”, American Economic 
Review, 2003, Vol. 93, p.1456. See also R. KOROBKIN & T. ULEN, “Law & Behavioral Science: Removing 
the Rationality Assumption from Law & Economics”, California Law Review, 2000, Vol. 88, p. 1105.  
14
 On all these points, see M. STUCKE, “Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the 21st Century”, op. 
cit., pp. 568-572. 
15
 Entrants disregard many entry barriers. They are not significantly deterred from industries where capital 
intensity and scale economics play an important role. They disregard sunk cost effects. See A. TOR, “The Fable 
of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal Policy”, Michigan Law Review , Vol. 101, pp. 493-
494. 
16
 Managers tend to be overoptimist about their capacities and their firms. For a survey of the studies on this 
phenomenon, see: C. ENGEL, The Behaviour of Corporate Actors. A Survey of the Empirical Literature, 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn 2008/23, May 2008, p. 7. 
(available at: www.ssrn.com). 
17
 Empirically, entrants exhibit strikingly high mortality rate; those who survive are characterized by low 
penetration figures: “Within ten years, only about 20% of any entrant cohort still operates. Attrition, moreover, 
begins right from the start, with more than 25% of new entrants exiting within two years, over 60% disappearing 
within five years.” See A. TOR, “The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality”, op. cit., p. 491. 




This is because – contrary to a dogma of neo-classical economics – firms can, and do, recoup 
sunk costs when fixing their prices18. 
 
All this indicates that an abstract appraisal of barriers to entry is insufficient to assess 
dominance19. Modern EU competition law seems to be generally in line with this. The recent 
Commission Guidance document on Article 102 stresses the importance of going beyond an 
impressionistic identification of barriers to entry, and insists on proving “likely” entry. The 





Even more remarkably, a random walk through Article 102 TFEU case-law suggests that 
behavioral economics has been, and may be relevant, in many abuse of dominance cases21.  
 
A. Predatory Pricing 
 
Under conventional economic theory, a dominant firm engages into unlawful predation when 
it sets prices below costs (at a loss) to force rivals off the market. From a conventional, 
industrial organization perspective, predatory pricing is akin to a two-stage investment 
strategy. The dominant firm incurs short-term losses because it anticipates to secure long-term 
benefits. This view has been strictly endorsed in the US, where courts dismiss predatory 
pricing allegations absent proof that recoupment of losses is possible22. Pricing below costs 
absent a reasonable prospect of recoupment is irrational. The courts thus consider that 
predatory pricing has not happened23. This solution is often portrayed as overly generous to 
                                                           
18
 M. ARMSTRONG and S. HUCK, “Behavioral Economics as Applied to Firms: A Primer”, Competition 
Policy International, Spring 2010, vol 6, n°1, p. 27. 
19
 Hence, in assessing the probability of entry, regulators should only focus on larger, diversifying entrants which 
are likely to exercise short-term competitive pressure. A. TOR, “A behavioural approach to antitrust law and 
economics”, Consumer Policy Review, 2004, Vol. 14, n°1, p. 4 
20
 Similarly, its document also declares that “For expansion or entry to be considered sufficient, it cannot be 
simply small-scale entry, for example into some market niche, but must be of such a magnitude as to be able to 
deter any attempt to increase prices by the putatively dominant undertaking in the relevant market.” Guidance 
document, op. cit., para. 16. 
21
 There is an unlawful abuse when the dominant firm excludes its competitors (exclusionary abuse) or exploits 
its customers (exploitative abuse) in an anticompetitive way. 
22
 See, for example, See for example: US Supreme Court, 21 June 1993, Brooke Group Ltd v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 US 209, 113 S. Ct 2578 
23
 Concretely, it results in situations in which, “If a plaintiff’s complaint describes a conspiracy that the judge 
concludes is irrational, then the court rules that the conspiracy must not have happened as a matter of law, 




the dominant firm. Yet, as any firm which generates losses, the dominant firm that prices 
below costs, compromises its chances to stay viably on the market, with the distrust of capital 
markets, shareholders, suppliers, etc. In other words, the market will self-correct the anomaly 
of pricing below costs absent recoupment, in pushing the dominant firm out of business. 
 
Behavioral economics suggests, however, that predatory pricing is more pervasive than 
predicated by industrial organization theory. Overoptimistic managers may, for instance, price 
below costs absent realistic recoupment perspectives. In the same vein, pride, vengeance, 
arrogance or hubris may prompt irrational managers to launch a price war regardless of its 
costs24. Finally, regardless of recoupment, dominant firms may simply engage into predation 
to enjoy a “quiet” life. The outcome of predation, although irrational in the classic economic 
sense, is “satisfactory” and thus makes sense from a behavioral standpoint25.  
 
Unlike US antitrust law, EU competition law accommodates irrational predation scenarios. 
According to the Commission’s Guidance document, the determination of abusive predation 
exclusively hinges on the existence of a sacrifice, i.e. a price below costs26.  By contrast, a 
finding of abuse is not contingent on the proof of plausible recoupment. In the recent France 
Telecom ruling, the Court held that the proof of recoupment was not a “precondition” to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
regardless of the evidence presented by the plaintiff to support its claim”, C. LESLIE, “Rationality Analysis in 
Antitrust”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Jan. 2010, Vol. 158, n°2, p. 269 
24
 M. ARMSTRONG and S. HUCK, op. cit, p. 16. The proclivity of individuals to satisfy their appetite for 
vengeance has been demonstrated through the Ultimatum Game. Here, two players must share a specified prize. 
One player suggests a way to share the prize, while the second answer to the offer. If they find an agreement, the 
prize is divided accordingly. Otherwise, neither player gets anything. A rational outcome would be for the 
responder to accept a small offer, since he should prefer a small payoff to nothing. However, it is observed that 
responders generally accept to sacrifice offers they judge unfair, in order to punish the adverse, stingy party for 
the unfairness of his offer. R. THALER, “Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game”, The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 1988, Vol. 2, No. 4. p. 195 
25
 People do not tend to maximize their profits, but, instead, to reach a satisfactory level of outcome. See 
M. ARMSTRONG and S. HUCK, op. cit., p. 22.  
26
 However, other practices might also be taken into account by the Commission to determine whether a specific 
practice constitutes a predatory abuses – including any losses that the alleged predator could have avoided.  
Guidance document, op. cit., para. 64 and 65. 




establish an abuse27. This is also the view taken by the Commission in its Guidance 
document28.  
 
On close examination, EU predatory pricing law seems even behavioralist in essence. The 
Court has for instance repeatedly held that the reason for the prohibition of predatory pricing 
lies in the fact that pricing below-costs is wholly irrational conduct, which can only be 
motivated by exclusionary intent29. In other words, what matters is the mindset, and motives, 




1. Tying/Bundling as an exclusionary abuse 
 
In a conventional tying/bundling scenario, a dominant firm in market A seeks to leverage its 
market position to market B, by subordinating the sale of A to the purchase of B (tying); by 
selling only a bundle of products AB (pure bundling); or by granting a rebate on the bundle of 
products AB (mixed bundling)31.  
 
                                                           
27
 GC, 30 Jan. 2007, T-340/03, France Télécom v. Commission, E.C.R., 2007, p. II-00107, para. 228. Prior to 
this, there were doubts. Referring to the Tetra Pak ruling, commentators held that “In fact, the Court does not say 
in paragraph 44 that it would never be necessary to show the feasibility of recoupment, but only that it would not 
be appropriate in the circumstances of the present case.” A. JONES & B. SUFRIN, EC Competition Law. Text, 
Cases, and Materials, Oxford, Oxford Publishing, 2008, 3rd ed., p. 461. 
28
 “As predation may turn out to be more difficult than expected at the start of the conduct, the total costs to the 
dominant undertaking of predating could outweigh its later profits and thus make actual recoupment impossible 
while it may still be rational to decide to continue with the predatory strategy that it started some time ago.” 
Guidance document, op.cit., para. 71, footnote 6. 
29
 The case-law relies on below-cost pricing benchmarks as surrogates for exclusionary intent. A similar 
psychological background explains the somewhat disconcerting prohibition of certain above-costs pricing 
practices under EU law, when there is proof of a deliberate plan to remove a competitor of the market. Under EU 
law, the state of mind, and motives, of dominant firms are key to the assessment. Overall, behavioral economics 
supports the policy choices made by the EU institutions to discard recoupment as a necessary condition for a 
finding of infringement under Article 102 TFEU. 
30
 See GC, France Telecom, op. cit., para. 110. 
31
 In a few cases, the Commission issued statements of objections for mixed bundling practices –or “multi-
products rebates”. Mixed bundling is characterized by the fact that consumers are free to buy each good 
individually, as both tying and tied products are made available separately, but the sum of the prices when sold 
separately is higher than the bundled price. In the Coca-Cola Company case, for example, the Commission drove 
the giant of Atlanta to accept negotiated commitments and put an end to mixed bundling practices. Coca-cola 
agreed to no longer offer rebate to its customers who committed to buy less popular products together with its 
strongest brands.  See Commission decision of 22 June 2005 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 82 of 
the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/A.39.116/B2 — Coca-Cola), OJ, L253/21. 




Tying may constitute an unlawful abuse32, if the dominant firm forecloses equally efficient 
competitors33. In this regard, a key, critical condition for a finding of abuse is that customers 
are “coerced” (or forced) to purchase the tied product. Coercion may take the form of a 
physical tie (a common packaging) or of an economic tie (a rebate on the purchase of the two 
products). Absent any such tie, standard economic theory predicts that consumers will turn to 
competitive products.  
 
Against this background, behavioral economics suggests that dominant firms may also 
leverage market power absent coercion, simply by exploiting customers’ intrinsic biases34. To 
take a simple example, laptop buyers are generally prone to buy a laptop bag in the shop 
where they purchase their computer, because of inertia, hassle costs, availability heuristics 
and risk aversion35. In such a setting, the laptop manufacturer may leverage its market power 
on the market for bags, by taking advantage of consumers’ weaknesses. He will simply have 
to display the two products in the same retail outlet. Consumers will end up purchasing the 
two products, regardless of the absence of coercion and of the existence of competitive 
alternatives in other points of sales36.  
 
Again, EU abuse of dominance law accommodates such scenarios of “psychological” 
bundling. In its Microsoft decision in 2004, the Commission found that Microsoft had 
unlawfully bundled its operating system Windows with its Windows Media Player (“WMP”). 
In this case, however, Microsoft had not coerced in the economic or technical sense. 
Customers had not been required to pay anything extra for WMP. In addition, customers 
could freely decide to use rival media players through “multi-homing” (acquire, install and 
use several media players on a single PC). This notwithstanding, the Commission found that 
                                                           
32
 According to Article 102 TFUE, an “abuse may, in particular, consist in (…) making the conclusion of 
contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or 
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts”. 
33
 Guidance document, op. cit., para. 59-61. 
34
 M. BENETT, J. FINGLETON, A. FLETCHER, L. HURLEY and D. RUCK, “What Does Behavioral 
Economics Mean for Competition Policy ?”, Competition Policy International, Spring 2010, vol 6, n°1, p. 121 : 
“Behavioral economics suggests that even small switching costs can have significant effects on consumer 
behavior in the presence of consumer inertia, endowment effects, and default bias. This can, in turn, make 
foreclosure more likely to occur through tying and bundling.” 
35
 Because computers are both expansive and fragile, it is not unlikely that consumers who have made such 
spending feel the compulsive need to immediately buy a sleeve for the protection of their laptop. Risk aversion 
could explain such a behaviour, as well as availability heuristic, the experience of the expense being the most 
vivid to the memory just after the payment.   
36
 Therefore, leveraging could occur between two complementary products solely because the commercial 
environment bundles the products.     




the pre-installation of WMP on Windows had created an environment conducive to 
leveraging, because of “end-users inertia”37. The Commission for instance noted at ¶845 of 
its decision that “Users who find WMP pre-installed on their client PCs are indeed in general 
less likely to use alternative media players as they already have an application which delivers 
media streaming and playback functionality”. This finding was upheld by the CFI38. 
 
This shows that EU competition law captures anticompetitive bundling strategies which go 
well beyond conventional economic theory.  
 
2. Remedies for Abusive Bundling – “Nudging” Customers? 
 
The issue of remedies in bundling cases illustrates even more clearly the blending of EU 
competition law and behavioral economics. To stick to the example of the Microsoft I case, 
the Commission had ordered the dominant firm to eliminate the abuse by commercializing a 
naked version of Windows, devoid of WMP39. A few months later, only a few thousands 
version of this stripped software had been sold, and most end-users continued to use WMP40.  
 
Interestingly, a little later, the Commission applied an entirely different remedy in the context 
of a wholly similar case, the Microsoft II case. This case concerned the tying of the web 
browser Internet Explorer to Windows. The Commission obtained from Microsoft the 
commitment to make available a “ballot screen” forcing new Windows PC users to initially 
make a pre-selection between a range of competing web browsers41. 
 
                                                           
37
 Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft), para 870. 
38
 GC, 17 Sept. 2007, T-201/04, Microsoft v. Commission, E.C.R., 2007, p. II-03601. 
39
 Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft), Article 6, p. 300. 
40
 As media players are widely available for free, the Commission did not impose on Microsoft to charge a lower 
price for the unbundled version of Windows. As could have been expected in such circumstances, the operation 
amounted to a commercial failure: no computer manufacturer in the world chose to install the unbundled version 
of Windows on any of their computers; retailers bought 1,787 copies which amounted to less than 0.005 percent 
of the copies of all sales of Windows XP sold at retail in Europe. See C. AHLBORN and S. EVANS, “The 
Microsoft Judgment and its Implications for Competition Policy towards Dominant Firms in Europe”, Antitrust 
Law Journal, 2009, Vol. 75, No. 3, (available at www.ssrn.com) p. 24. 
41
 Summary of Commission Decision of 16 December 2009 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement  (Case COMP/39.530 — 
Microsoft (Tying)), OJ, 13 Feb. 2010, C 36/7. 




This new remedy draws obvious inspiration from the approach advocated by behavioralist 
scholars Thaler and Sunstein in their best-seller Nudge42. Because a simple remedy removing 
the antitrust offense – such as the one devised in the Microsoft I case – was ill-suited to 
restore competition, the Commission opted for a more intrusive, “paternalistic” remedy, 
which nudges consumers to make a choice43.  
 
C. Refusal to deal 
 
The conventional theory of harm ascribed to refusals to deals is as follows. A vertically-
integrated firm that controls an essential upstream input (a network, an intellectual property 
right, etc.) can foreclose downstream rivals by refusing them access to its input. In turn, the 
degree of competition on the downstream market might be harmed.  
 
In recent years, US antitrust law and EU competition law have followed different approaches 
in relation to refusals to supply. In the US, the Supreme Court ruling in Trinko has reduced 
somewhat drastically the circumstances under which a firm may be found guilty of unlawful 
refusal to supply. Amongst other things, the Supreme Court indeed considers that firms’ ex 
ante incentives to invest might be undermined by intrusive ex post regulatory takings and 
price controls.  
 
By contrast, in the EU, the CFI Microsoft ruling has significantly extended the range of 
circumstances under which a dominant firm can be ordered to deal with rivals. The EU courts 
allegedly exhibit less concerns in relation to dominant firms’ ex ante incentives to invest44.  
 
On close examination, behavioral economics bring support to the expansive interpretation 
endorsed by the EU Courts. First, recent economics findings indicate that individuals 
occasionally suffer from an “endowment effect”. Anyone who owns a good tends to value it 
                                                           
42
 See supra, note 2. 
43
 If this new remedy was to fail again – because, for instance, consumers are reluctant to execute a browser they 
have never heard about – the Commission might have to consider new ways to assist customers in future cases. 
Many IT websites are community driven. Therefore in Microsoft, the Commission could have, for instance, 
required the dominant firm to integrate within the ballot screen random abstracts from these sites in order to 
provide a review of the browsers and independent guidance to the customers as to what choice to make. 
44
 If the Commission, on its side, still refers to the need to preserve ex ante incentives to invest (Guidance 
document, op. cit., para. 75), only three conditions must be met for an order to supply to be issued. It suffices to 
prove that the refusal relates to a product or service that is objectively necessary, that it is likely to foreclose 
competitors and in turn, lead to consumer harm. (Ibid., para. 81). The proof that the refusal prevents the 
appearance of a new product is no longer requested.  




above the market price and demands more for it than what he would be willing to pay to 
acquire a similar good45. Behavioral economics thus warrants regulatory intervention because 
holders of essential facilities often (i) charge abnormal input prices to their rivals and (ii) 
overestimate the value of their asset, and in turn the alleged chilling effect on their ex ante 
incentives to invest.  
 
Second, behavioral economics dismisses the concerns of a number of commentators, who – in 
the aftermath of the Microsoft case – have argued that the Court’s case-law would 
disincentivize investments into innovation. Given that managers “discard events of extremely 
low probability”46, it is unlikely that the few Article 102 TFEU cases ordering a duty to deal 
will ever deter firms to innovate47.  
 
D. Unfair trading conditions 
 
Unlike in US antitrust law, a prime objective of EU competition law is to ensure that 
dominant firms do not directly exploit their customers by charging supra-competitive prices 
and other anticompetitive commercial conditions. Article 102(a) TFEU provides to this effect 
that dominant firms shall not “directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling 
prices or other unfair trading conditions”.  
 
A key finding of behavioral economics is that when customers face complex pricing 
strategies, characterized by a low up-front fee coupled with expensive follow-on services, 
they often end-up with undesired deals. Naïve, short term-sighted customers will indeed over-
consume, either because they under-estimate the costs they will later incur48.  
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With this in mind, manufacturers can manipulate customers through “shrouding” practices (or 
“hidden charges”). For instance, shrouding is often said to arise in relation to video rentals 
(with huge penalties for delay), hotel services (with shrouded charges for parking, internet 
access, etc.) or mobile telephony (with excessive international roaming charges). Shrouding 
may also take place in aftermarkets (printers and ink cartridges, for instance)49. Because 
shrouding has undesirable effects on consumers, several behavioral economists have called 
for public intervention through regulation50. 
 
Again, EU competition law provides a basis to curb dominant firms’ shrouding practices. In 
Tetra Pak II, for instance, the Commission found that a dominant had unlawfully rented 
packaging equipment to its customers on unfair, shrouded, conditions. Customers of the 
dominant firm that had modified or moved the leased equipment had been requested to pay an 
“amount not only equivalent to almost all present and future rental payments combined but 
moreover roughly the same as, and sometimes even higher than, selling prices”51. 
 
In the same vein, the Commission found that Tetra Pak's right to fix a penalty at its own 
discretion in case of contractual infringement was tantamount to an unlawful abuse. On the 
facts, the penalties amounted could be up to 5 to 10 % of the base rental, or equivalent to 
approximately one year's rental payments52. 
 
Of course, Article 102 TFEU only applies to dominant firm’s conduct. EU competition law 
thus offers no means to eradicate shrouding practices which, as shown by behavioral 
economics, may occur in oligopolistic markets where no firm individually occupies a 
dominant position (for instance, in the banking, insurance or mobile telephony sectors). This 
being said, EU competition authorities could, at least in theory, challenge such hidden charges 
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through creative interpretations of Article 102 TFEU. Coupled with the growing influence of 
behavioral economics, the embryonic doctrine of collective dominance may, for instance, 




The above remarks tend to demonstrate that EU competition law, and in particular the law of 
abuse of dominance, does not disregard – and may even have drawn inspiration from – the 
insights of behavioral economics. In a not insignificant number of cases, the Commission and 
the EU Courts have strayed away, consciously or unconsciously, from the neo-classical 
dogma of economic rationality. This, in turn, may explain some discrepancies between, on the 
one hand, the intrusive EU enforcement practice under Article 102 TFEU and, on the other 
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